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A recent definition of computational creativity has em-
phasised that computational creativity systems should
“take on certain responsibilities” for generating creative
behaviour. This paper examines the notion of responsi-
bilities in that definition, and looks at a number of as-
pects of the creative act and its context that might play
a role in that responsibility, with an emphasis on artistic
and musical creativity. This problematises the seem-
ingly simple distinction between systems that have re-
sponsibilities for creative activity and those which sup-
port or provide tools for creativity. The paper con-
cludes with a discussion of an alternative approach to
the subject, which argues that the responsibility for cre-
ative action is typically diffused through a complex hu-
man/computer system, and that a “systems thinking”
approach to locating computational creativity might ask
better questions than one that tries to pin creative re-
sponsibility to a particular agent.
Introduction
A recent paper by Colton and Wiggins (2012, p21) gives a
succinct definition of computational creativity as “the phi-
losophy, science and engineering of computational systems
which, by taking on particular responsibilities, exhibit be-
haviours that unbiased observers would deem to be creative.
Compared to earlier attempts to define this area, this def-
inition is notable because it does not define computational
creativity with regard to human creativity.
By contrast, earlier definitions have been grounded in
comparisons with human creative behaviour. For example,
Ritchie (2007, p69) grounds his list of criteria for attributing
creativity to a computer program thus: “A central assump-
tion here is that any formal definition of creativity must be
based on its ordinary usage; that is, it must be natural and it
must be based on human behaviour.”. Furthermore, an ear-
lier overview by Colton, de Ma´ntaras and Stock (2009, p11)
begins with the statement that, “At its heart, computational
creativity is the study of building software that exhibits be-
havior that would be deemed creative in humans.”.
In this paper I will explore a specific phrase in the
definition— “taking on particular responsibilities” which is
the main difference with previous definitions. I would like
to explore where these “particular responsibilities” might sit
in the creative process, and how the use of computers might
change our idea of where that responsibility might sit. In
particular, my focus will be on artistic and musical creativity,
though there may be implications for other creative areas.
Who/what is “responsible” for a particular creative artistic
act? We can argue that there are a number of things that
share this responsibility (here we frame these in the context
of a human artist):
• The artist themselves, their actions and patterns of be-
haviour.
• The artist’s motivation to create the work.
• The background knowledge that the artist has acquired
through life, which reflects their general cultural back-
ground and specific things that they have encountered or
learned.
• The context in which they are making the work.
• The materials that they are using to make the work. In
particular, the “resistance”, “grit” and “grain” offered by
some materials, which can provide new material that can
be serendipitously exploited by the artist.
It is commonly seen as the first of these as the action that
takes on “responsibility” for the artistic creation. However,
when we try to pin down why this is so, we might start by
arguing that had the artist not decided to carry out that partic-
ular behaviour, to decide not to create that particular work,
then the work would not exist. But, the same argument can
be applied to the other items on the list: had the artist not
had the relevant background knowledge, or had the material
worked in a different way, and so on, the work would not
have been capable of being created. We can, of course, take
this argument to ludicrous extremes—part of the responsi-
bility for the art being the artists own existence, etc.
Indeed, this is not just an intellectual exercise; determin-
ing the responsibility (or credit) for a creative act is im-
portant for legal arguments concerning intellectual property
rights. McGregor (2014) has recently argued that the le-
gal arguments around creativity might provide a framework
for considering computational creativity; along similar lines,
Koza (2010) has argued for the use of patentability as a cri-
terion to determine when an AI system is creating artefacts
that require “human-competitive” levels of intelligence.
We might stop at a “proximate” cause as being the pri-
mary point at which the responsibility lies. But, what is the
proximate cause? We might argue that the immediate ac-
tions of making the art are the artist’s behaviours, in putting
pencil to paper in a particular way. But, even at such a proxi-
mate level, we can see that that activity interacts closely with
the artist’s motivation, and that during the time-span of cre-
ating even a single, simple piece of work there might be a
complex interaction between motivation and action.
So, where is the computer in all of this? I have argued
elsewhere (Johnson, 2012) that computational creativity re-
search has focused too much on the role of the individual
creator, favouring the view of the creative “romantic hero”
over forms of creativity that are based on collaboration or the
mediation of interaction. In this paper I would like to argue
further that the nature of computer-grounded artistic creativ-
ity makes assigning this responsibility even harder than it
would be for traditional artforms.
The remainder of this paper splits into three sections. The
first is concerned with the role of materials, and in particular
whether computational artistic and musical materials present
a particular challenge for making the distinction between
passive tools/materials and active agents to which creative
responsibility can be ascribed. The second is an examination
of context and background, and considers, through examples
of search-based art and semantic mass, whether these can be
considered to have any responsibility for the creative action.
Finally, a concluding section examines whether a better way
to examine this is through a “systems thinking” view, rather
than a view based on the notion of responsibility.
Materials
What is an artistic material, or an artistic tool, and how does
it differ from something that plays a collaborative role in
artistic creation? For traditional artworks, the distinction is
clear. For example, an artist uses a tool such as a pencil
to create their art, a musician uses an instrument to create
a piece of music. Part of an artistic training is to learn to
“master” such tools; to learn how to realise artistic intents
through the coordinated use of perception, thought and the
manipulation of tools. But, even at the level of simple phys-
ical tools, there is some level of interaction between the tool
and artistic creation—part of the study of a particular artis-
tic medium is learning its constraints, and learning how to
make adaptations when a particular intentional action does
not realise the intended aim.
Certain computational artistic media and tools make this
distinction between passive tools and media that are manip-
ulated by an artist or musician, and participants that take
an active (creative?) role in the artistic creation. Rowe
(1993) has discussed a continuum of interactive computer
music systems, ranging from simple action-response sys-
tems where a performer makes a physical gesture and gen-
erates a consistent sound, to systems which listen and make
sound as an autonomous and equal participant in a musical
interaction. An example of the latter might be the Voyager
system (Lewis, 2000); these ideas have been taken further
by Paine (2002).
We would probably consider something to the latter end
of the continuum to sit comfortably within definitions of
computational creativity such as that discussed at the begin-
ning of this paper. Whilst a system of that kind might always
perform within an interactive context with other (human or
computer) performers, it is “responsible” for holding up its
own end in the music being produced, and “creating” music
that is sensitive to the current situation. There are multiple
“responsible” agents involved, and nothing playing the role
of “mere tool”.
But, when we look at systems towards the middle of that
continuum, the allocation of creative responsibility becomes
murkier. For example, consider the LIES system by San-
filippo (2012). This consists of a number of acoustic feed-
back loops, which initially create sounds by creating posi-
tive feedback cycles that can start from tiny fluctuations in
the performance environment. These are modified by a large
number of digital filters and feedback networks. The per-
former interacts with this system by adjusting the parameters
of the various filters and intensity of the feedback system.
What is responsible for the final creative output in this
system? The interaction between human and machine is
complex and at times incomprehensible to the human; the
performance mode is one where the human sometimes tries
to control the sound being generated to bring it into line with
a desired sound (sometimes successfully, sometimes not),
sometimes just letting the sound unfold without interference,
and sometimes to explore the effect of parameter changes
with, depending on context, a greater or lesser understand-
ing of the likely effects. Certainly, the system generates a
decent amount of the creative material here, with the human
sometimes (importantly—not all of the time) being unable
to shape the system’s outputs in any comprehensible way.
The systems view of this creativity is articulated well by
the creator of the system: “. . . the human and machine are
considered as inseparable: two autonomous entities which,
unavoidably, will influence each other, creating a unique
meta-system made up of these two elements. The human
and the machine establish a dialectics, a talking through the
other, with no attempts of subordination, creating a perfor-
mance which is the result of their cooperation, where, thus,
the performer creates together with the machine.” (Sanfil-
ippo, 2012).
Is this a computational creativity system? All of the
sounds are coming from the system (but, the same is true
for a piano). The human would not be able to make the
work without the machine (but, the same is true of an
artist without a pencil or whatever). Nonetheless, the com-
puter/electronic system seems to be playing a stronger cre-
ative role in this interaction than that. Perhaps part of this
is that the human is sometimes reacting to the outputs of the
computer system as much as they are trying to shape it.
Contexts and Background Knowledge
In the list towards the beginning of the paper, we identified
the background knowledge of the creator, and the context in
which they were working in, as other things that could form
part of what is responsible for a particular creative action or
outcome.
Where is this background knowledge in a computational
creativity system? In many cases it has been included as
a part of the basic architecture of the system: for exam-
ple, in Cohen’s AARON system (Cohen, 1995), its figurative
works are generated from parameterised algorithms that de-
scribe the basic figurative structures that are used to create
the work. Other work draws on internet search algorithms
as a way of accessing a background of knowledge (Johnson,
2013).
Can a way of accessing information, enabled by a technol-
ogy, become part of the creative responsibility that a com-
puter system provides to a creative activity or outcome? To
what extent does the choice to use a complex, unpredictable
computational technique in creating a work of art mean that
that artwork has had a creative contribution from the com-
putational system?
Let us consider a specific example. The image in Figure 1
is created by using the well-known Google image search
functionality to search for images related to the word “se-
cure” (filtered for images of a certain colour palette). If I
choose to exhibit this as an artwork, where does the respon-
sibility for the creative decisions sit? With me, alone? But I
have hardly done anything! With the Google information re-
trieval system? With the people who have provided images
for the system?
One role that computer systems—not just individual com-
puters, but networked collections of computers with an asso-
ciated infrastructure of information gathering and informa-
tion retrieval—might play is to facilitate whole new areas of
creativity. For example, the existence of vast online collec-
tions of images, together with technology of evergrowing so-
phistication to search and group such images by their mean-
ings, facilitates a way of creating artworks that we might de-
scribe as semantic mass, where large collections of related
information are gathered together and displayed.
Consider an example such as Jennifer Mills’s
work What’s in a Name? (Figure 2), consisting of a
large number of postcard-size paintings, each of which
represents a person with the name “Jennifer Mills”, gained
from a search on Facebook. Is this work an artist’s reflection
on the ready ability to track down all of these people using
the computer system, or is this a piece of collaborative
creativity between the artist and that system? Even if it
is not, does the system bear any “responsibility” for the
artwork—any more than the paintbrush used to create the
work?
Manovich (2002) has made related observations, that a
technology can, by facilitating a change in the speed or scale
of a process, create something which an observer might see
as a genuinely new system. This can be seen by contrast-
ing the Mills piece with comedian Dave Gorman’s pre-web-
search project Are You Dave Gorman?, where he tracked
down a large number of people with the same name has
him (Gorman, 2001). The Gorman project is focused on
the labour of making the connections; the Mills piece on its
effortlessness.
A number of artists and musicians have chosen to deliber-
ately divest themselves of the responsibility of making cre-
ative choices in their art. Perhaps the best known of these is
John Cage, who created musical/theatrical works based on
chance processes or on transcoding (Manovich, 2002) non-
musical objects. An example of the latter is Atlas Eclip-
itcalis, where star-charts were transcribed onto music staff
paper, with stars representing notes, and the resulting music
performed. By refusing the composer’s traditional “respon-
sibility” to decide (at a detailed level) where the notes go
on a page, where has “responsibility” for the artwork gone?
Perhaps an argument can be made that the responsibility
has been abstracted to a higher level—that the details of the
notes “don’t matter”, but the choice of star maps, rather than
any any other printed material, is where the creator has cho-
sen to vest his responsibility. A version of this argument has
been made by Xenakis (1992), presenting a form of music
in which the composer manipulates large-scale parameters
of generative algorithms, rather than details.
There is a connection too, to the ideas of Goldsmith
(2011), who has discussed the idea of “ostensive creativity”,
i.e. a means of being creative by “pointing at” material in the
world, or organising it in a way that makes us see it afresh.
Internet search based art can be seen as a form of this. But,
who is doing the pointing?
Again, we are drawn back to a system view of the idea of
creative responsibility. All of these components have some
bearing on the final creative activity, and it is their interac-
tions that lead to creativity happening, rather than one play-
ing a responsible role and the others a supporting role.
Conclusions
At first it seems easy to distinguish between a system that
is a tool that can be used in the aid of creative action, and
one that takes on the responsibility for the creative act it-
self. However, when we look at complex, resistant artistic
materials, systems containing complex interactions between
humans and computers, and the kinds of human creativity
and relational creativity that depend irreducibly on comput-
ers or networks of computers, then the distinction between a
responsible creative agent, a creativity support system, and
the more complex kind of tool become rather blurred.
It is easy to understand why the idea of responsibility
finds its way into a definition of computational creativity.
There is always a sneaky suspicion in a system involving
interaction between humans and computers that all of the
creativity is “coming from” the human (even when that hu-
man demonstrates surprise at the output from the system!).
There is also the desire to distinguish creative systems from
“mere tools”. It is fairly clear that this can be done, up to
a point, but the point at which tools slip over from being
passive to being an active player in the creative process is a
rather vague one.
Indeed, it is precisely because computers can be used to
build complex, interactive, indeterminate systems that this
distinction starts to become more problematic. Indeed, it
is perhaps naive to assume that even in traditional non-
computational artistic and musical creativity that a simple
distinction can be drawn between individuals responsible
for their creative action and the tools and concepts that they
make use of. After all, reams of pages are written that at-
tempt to explain why a particular artistic action was done by
Figure 1: Google image search result for the word “secure”.
Figure 2: Extract from What’s in a name?, Jennifer Mills, 2009-11.
contextualising it in the political, economic and social situa-
tion in which it is created.
One alternative approach would be to apply a “systems
thinking” approach (Churchman, 1968) to this question.
This approach would argue that it is futile to try and assign a
particular component of the “art creating system” the defini-
tive responsibility for producing the art work. Instead, there
is a complex system of interacting agents and properties that
lead to the work being realised (or not!) in the form that it
ends up. By doing this, we are not throwing our hands in the
air and saying that nothing can be said about how the work
is produced. Instead, we are arguing that there is a complex
system of interactions which in itself needs to be studied.
Indeed, Csikszentmihalyi (1988) has explored a similar ap-
proach to explaining human creativity.
Perhaps we can modify the Colton/Wiggins definition in
the following way: “the philosophy, science and engineer-
ing of computational systems which, by playing a role in
an interactive system, contribute to that system producing
behaviours that unbiased observers would deem to be cre-
ative”. Note that the systems have to “play a role” in the
system; this opens up the possibility of many different pos-
sible roles.
This would seem to bring many activities that are cur-
rently seen as part of computational creativity squarely into
the definition. For example, Veale (2011, 2013) has dis-
cussed the idea of creativity as a service, i.e. the provision
of computational components that can are designed to be
part of a larger creative system, glued together using web
services frameworks.
The main point, however, is not to contribute to a pedan-
tic (if sometimes enlightening) debate on definitions, but
to shift the emphasis of computational creativity research.
Rather than trying to identify the single actor in a complex,
interactive system that is “responsible” for the creativity, in-
stead we should recognise that this responsibility is diffuse
and part of the behaviour of a complex human/computer sys-
tem. That then leads onto much more interesting questions
about how such systems gives rise to creativity, how compo-
nents can be engineered for such systems, and how interac-
tions in such systems can be managed, rather than searching
for the single romantic hero who is the fount of all creativity
in the system.
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